FUNCTIONAL GRAMMAR
CLAUSE AS REPRESENTATION
Members :
CHAIRANI ANNISA (
2317.043 )
BULAN SARI ( 2317.064)
AFIKA USMAN (2317. 046)
BELLA NOFRIANTI (2317.56)
FITRIA HELMI (2317.
LECTURE :
Mrs. Dr.
Dra. Afdaleni, M.Pd, M.Pd
STATE ISLAMIC INSTITUTE OF
BUKITTINGGI
FACULTY OF TARBIYAH AND
TEACHER TRAINING
ENGLISH EDUCATION DEPARTMENT
2019M/1441H
PREFACE
Praise
to God almighty for the blessing of his grace, and that we were given the
opportunity to be able to complete a working paper entitled “National
Language and Language Planning” is properly and correctly, and on time.
This
paper is structure so that readers can know about National
Language and Language Planning. This paper was complied with help from
various parties. Both parties come from outside as well as from parties
concerned itself. And because the aid and help of God almighty, these papers
can be finally resolved.
The
compliers also thanked to Mrs. afdaleni as the teacher/tutors in English subject. Who
have many professors help compliers in order to complete this paper.
Hopefully
this paper can give a broader insight to the reader. Although this paper have
advantages and disadvantages. For advice and comment please his constituents.
Thank you.
Bukittinggi,04
november2019
Authors
TABLE
OF CONTENTS
PREFACE
CHAPTER
I
A.
Issue Background……..…………………….…………………………
B.
Problem formulation…………..….………….………………………..
C.
Purpose of the paper………..…………………………………………
CHAPTER
II
A.
Modelling experience of change………………………….…………………………………..
B.
Materialclauses;processesofdoing&happening ............................……………………
C.
Mental clause ; processing of sensing…...........................…..…………………………….
D.
Relational clauses..............……………………………………………………………..................
E.
Other process types..............…………………………………………………………….............
F.
Circumtantial elements..............……………………………………………………………......
G.
Transivity and voice..............…………………………………………………………….............
H.
Text illustrations..............……………………………………………………………...................
CHAPTER
III
A. CONCLUSION………………………………………………………..
B. SUGGESTION…………………………………………………………
BIBLIOGRAPHY
BAB II
DISCUSSION
A.
Modelling experience of
change
1. Construing experience as a third line
of meaning in the clause
the clause – like any other grammatical unit – is a
multifunctional construct consisting of three metafunctional lines of meaning: the
textual line of Theme ^
Rheme (the clause as message) and the interpersonal line of Mood + Residue
(the clause as exchange). the experiential line of organization. The three
metafunctional lines are unified within the structure of the clause; textual,
interpersonal and experiential functions are conflated with one another
a)
Textually, the clause
Well, usually means mostly, doesn’t it, Mary? presents a message as a new
turn in response to a query (the continuative well) concerned with an English
word (usually) that has just been queried; this is the Theme of the message.
b)
Interpersonally, the
clause enacts a proposition,
c)
And experientially, the
clause construes a quantum of change in the flow of events as a figure,
or configuration of a process, participants involved in it andany attendant
circumstances
Theme is the Subject, and the Subject is the Token in the
experiential structure of the clause; the alignment of these three functions in
the box diagram shows that (topical) Theme = Subject = Token (usually).
Similarly, two of the other interpersonal functions that fall within the Rheme
of the clause have distinct roles in the experiential structure: the
combination of Finite and Predicator = Process (means), Complement = Value
(mostly).
2. Types of process
Our most powerful impression of experience is that it consists
of a flow of events, or ‘goings-on’. This flow of events is chunked into quanta of
change by the grammar of the clause: each quantum of change is modelled as a figure –
a figure of happening, doing, sensing, saying, being or having (see Halliday & Matthiessen, 1999)..
The grammar sets up a discontinuity between these two: it
distinguishes rather clearly between outer experience, the processes of the external world, and
inner experience, the processes of consciousness. The grammatical categories are
those of material process clauses and mental process clauses represents process type as a semiotic space, with different
regions representing different types. The regions have core areas and these represent
prototypical members of the process types; but the regions are continuous, shading
into one another and these border areas represent the fact that the process types are fuzzy
categories Emotion is one of a
number of experiential domains that are construed in more than one way within the
system of transitivity.
3. Process, participants and
circumstances
A
figure consists, in principle, of three components
(i)
a process unfolding through time
(ii)
the participants involved in the process
(iii)
circumstances associated with the process
So in this instance we have a process are flying, a participant birds, and
a circumstantial element in the sky. In this interpretation of what is
going on, there is doing, a doer, and a location where the doing takes place. Circumstantial
elements are almost always optional augmentations of the clause rather than obligatory components.
In contrast, participants are inherent in the process: every experiential type
of clause has at least one
participant and certain types have up to three participants – the only
exception being, as just noted above, clauses of certain meteorological processes without
any participants. The process is the most central element in the configuration.
B. Material clauses: processes of doing-&-happening
1. Introductory examples
‘material’ clauses are clauses of
doing- &-happening: a
‘material’ clause construes a quantum of change in the flow of events as taking place
through some input of energy. Processes of all types unfold through time; but
the way the process unfolds may vary from one process type to
another. In particular, processes of the ‘material’ type tend to differ from all the other
types (with the partial exception of ‘behavioural’ processes and this is seen
in how present time is reported
2. Transitive and intransitive material
clauses
In a ‘material’ clause, there is always one participant – the Actor.
This participant brings
about the unfolding of the
process through time, leading to an outcome that is different from the
initial phase of the unfolding. This outcome may be confined to the Actor itself,
in which case there is only one participant inherent in the process. Such a ‘material’ clause
represents a happening and, using traditional terminology we can call it intransitive. It will be noticed
that the term Actor is used in the interpretation of both the intransitive clause and the
transitive one; and this embodies a further assumption, namely that the lion has the same
function in both. ‘receptive’ variant, it is the Goal that is mapped on to the
Subject, so it is assigned modal responsibility and it is also the Theme in the ‘unmarked’ case; and
the Actor has the status of an Adjunct within the Rheme of the clause and, as an Adjunct,
3. Types of doing-&-happening
The quantum of change represented by a material clause is
construed as unfolding through distinct phases, typically over a fairly short interval of time – with at
least an initial phase of
unfolding and a separate final phase, as with tying down, replacing, cutting off,
and cutting. The final phase of unfolding is the outcome
of the process: it represents a change of some feature of one of the participants in the material
clause. In the procedural gardening text above, the outcome is that a shoot has been tied
down, cut or cut off, and so on: texts instructing people in procedures are typically
concerned with achieving such material outcomes. The nature of the outcome affecting the Actor
of an ‘intransitive’ clause and the Goal of a ‘transitive’ one turns
out to be the general criterion for recognizing more delicate subtypes
1)
In a ‘creative’ clause,
the outcome is the coming into existence of the Actor (‘intransitive’) or the
Goal (‘transitive’). The outcome is thus this participant itself, and
there is no separate element in the clause representing the
outcome.
2)
In a ‘transformative’
clause, the outcome is the change of some aspect of an already
existing Actor (‘intransitive’) or
Goal (‘transitive’).
4. Different types of material clauses
and additional participants
The Actor is an inherent participant in both intransitive and transitive
material clauses; the Goal is inherent only in transitive clauses. Scope is the most
general across different types of ‘material’ clause introduced in the
previous subsection; but they are all more restricted than Actor and Goal. in fact,
certain circumstances that are construed as inherent in a process. This happens with
‘enhancing’ clauses construing movement through space of a participant: here a circumstance
of Place represents the destination of that movement and may be inherent in the
process.
5. Concrete and abstract material clauses
These are treated grammatically in the language as types of
action; the appropriate probes would be for example What did AT&T’s stock do?, What
did AT&T do to the first-quarter results?, thus showing
that AT&T’s stock is interpretable as Actor and the first-quarter
results as Goal. Thus A&T’s stock slid is
modelled on the concrete the car (or other concrete entity) slid, fueling worries on the concrete fueling fires, dampened
the enthusiasm on the concrete dampened the fire, and so on. But as
the process becomes more abstract, so the distinction between Actor
and Goal becomes harder to
draw. With a concrete process it is usually clear which role a given participant is
playing: there is a sharp distinction between the boy kicked, where the
boy is Actor, and the
boy was kicked, where the boy is Goal. To understand expressions
such as these we need to broaden our view of what constitutes ‘goings-on’ – a
quantum of change in the flow of events. It is important to recognize that there may be more
than one kind of process in the grammar of a language; and that the functions
assumed by the participants in any clause are determined by the type of processmthat is involved.
Mental Processes : processes of sensing
Mental Clauses are concerned with our experience of the world of
our own consciousness. . They are clauses of sensing: a ‘mental’ clause
construes a quantum of change in the flow of events taking place in our own
consciousness. This process of sensing may be construed either as flowing from
a person’s consciousness or as impinging on it; but it is not construed as a
material act. ( H & M, p.197).
Mental clauses consist of a sensor, which is a human participant, and a
Phenomenon. There are, therefore, two directions of mental process : those that
emanate from the sensor (‘like’-type) or those that impinge upon the Sensor (
‘please’-type). More examples can be seen here. As well as this, mental
processes may be divided into four distinct types :
1.
Perceptive
– He saw the car
2.
Cognitive
– He knows the car
3.
Desirative
– He wants the car
4.
Emotive
– He likes the car
Interpreting ‘mental’ clauses
We have
identified some of the properties of ‘mental’ clauses that are either shared by
them as a class or characteristic of a significant subclass. These properties
differentiate them from ‘material’ clauses, so it is reasonable to ask if the
Actor + Process + Goal model used in the analysis of ‘material’ clauses is or
is not applicable to ‘mental’ ones.
Example :
Mary (sensor) liked (process: mental) the gift (phenomenon)
The gift (phenomenon) pleased(process : mental) Mary (sensor)
It seems therefore that we should abandon the Actor-Goal trail at
this point and recognize that ‘mental’ clauses are unlike ‘material’ process
clauses and require a different functional interpretation. Obviously c lauses
construing doing and clauses construing sensing are different in meaning, but
that is not enough to make them constitute distinct grammatical categories.
The nature of the Senser
In a clause of ‘mental’ process, there is always one participant
who is human; this is the Senser, introduced above: the one that ‘senses’ –
feels, thinks, wants or perceives, for example:
Mary in Mary liked the gift
More accurately, we should say human-like; the significant feature
of the Senser is that of being ‘endowed with consciousness’. Expressed in
grammatical terms, the participant that is engaged in the mental process is one
that is referred to pronominally as he or she, not as it.
Phenomenon
The Senser of a
‘mental’ clause is thus highly constrained. With regard to the other main
element in a clause of mental process, namely the Phenomenon. That which is
felt, thought, wanted or perceived, the position is in a sense reversed. That
is to say, the set of things that can take on this role in the clause is not
only not restricted to any particular semantic or grammatical category, it is
actually wider than the set of possible participants in a ‘material’ clause. It
may be not only a thing but also an act or a fact. In a ‘material’ clause,
every participant is a thing; that is, it is a phenomenon of our experience,
including of course our inner experience or imagination – some entity (person,
creature, institution, object, substance or abstraction). Any of these ‘things’
may also, of course, be the object of consciousness in a ‘mental’ clause; for
example:
-
You
recognize her?
-
I
don’t understand you y Inspector.
-
Do
you want lasagna? – Oh, I hate lasagna.
-
Only about four out of every 10 residents
affected even know their new number.
-
I
learned that lesson a long time ago.
-
Ashtray
upsets him.
-
After
that war nothing could frighten me anymore.
The thing construed as Phenomenon may even be a metaphorical one –
a nominal group with a nominalization as Head denoting a process or quality
reified as a thing :
Example : Amnesty ( Sensor) found (process : mental) persistent
abuses (Phenomenon).
These ‘things’ could all appear in a ‘material’ clause as well.
However, the concept of ‘thing’ is extended in ‘mental’ clauses to
includemacrophenomenal clauses where the Phenomenon is an act and
metaphenomenal clauses where the Phenomenon is a fact.
Example :
He (sensor) saw (process : mental) the send dredger heading for the
cruiser( phenomenon).
Projection
As we have
seen, ‘metaphenomenal mental’ clauses are configured with a fact as Phenomenon.
But there is one further option open to such clauses – an option that sets
them apart not only from ‘material’ clauses but also from ‘relational’ ones.
This option is the ability to set up another clause ‘outside’ the ‘mental’
clause as the representation of the ‘content’ of consciousness. This kind of
meaning is recognized very explicitly in the conventions of comic strips:
sensers are shown with ‘clouds’ emanating from them and the content of
consciousness is represented linguistically within these clouds. For example:
An unknown number of passengers are still missing || and police
presume they are dead.
I don’t believe that endorsing the Nuclear Freeze initiative is the
right step for California CC.
Here the ‘mental’ clause projects another clause (or combination of
clauses) as a representation of the content of thinking, believing, presuming,
and so on; the projected clause is called an idea clause. Thus while ‘fact’
clauses serve as the Phenomenon of a ‘mental’ clause and can therefore be made
Subject and be theme-predicated, ‘idea’ clauses are not part of the ‘mental’
clause but are rather combined with the ‘mental’ clause in a clause nexus of
projection.
Process: the system of tense
‘Material’ and ‘mental’ processes also differ with respect to the
way that they unfold in time and this is reflected in the grammatical system of
TENSE. What is the basic form of the present tense in modern English? In the
teaching of English as a foreign language there has been much controversy about
which to teach first, the simple present takes or the so-called ‘present
continuous’ or ‘present progressive’ is taking and claims have been made on
behalf of both. There is a reason for the controversy; in fact, either one of
these tenses may be the basic, unmarked form depending on the type of process
expressed by the clause. In a ‘mental’ clause, the unmarked present tense is
the simple present. For Example :
She likes the gift (not she is liking the gift)
Do you know the city? (not are you knowing the city?)
I see the stars (not I am seeing the stars)
But in a ‘material’ clause the unmarked present tense is the
present in present; we say
They’re building a house (not they build a house)
Are you making the tea? (not do you make the tea?)
I’m going home (not I go home)
Relational Clause : processes of being & having :
Basically, there are three types of relational processes – namely
attribute, identifying and possessive. In attributive relational clauses, there
is participant known as the Carrier. The carrier is assigmened an Attribute and
the former is mapped into the subject of the clause while the latter is mapped
into the complement of the clause. In identifying relational clauses, one
participant is equated to another. The participant which is identified is the
identified and the participant that identifies the identified is known as the
identifier. Possessive relational clauses have two participants – the Possessor
and the Possessed – usually linked by the verb have Existential process clauses
comprise a participant (the Existent), the word there and usually the verb be.
OTHER PROCESS TYPES, SUMMARY OF PROCESS TYPES
They are the principal types in that they are
the cornerstones of the grammar in its guise as a theory of experience, they present three
distinct kinds of structural configuration, and they account for the majority of all
clauses in a text (‘material’ and ‘relational’ seem to be roughly balanced in frequency over the
language as a whole, followed by ‘mental’, although the pattern varies considerably among
different registers). We can then go on to recognize three subsidiary process types,
located at each of the boundaries: behavioural at the boundary between material and
mental, verbal at the boundary between mental and relational, and existentialat
the boundary between relational and material
a) Behavioural clauses
b) Verbal clauses
Verbal clauses projecting quotes and
reports
In certain respects, ‘verbal’ clauses
are thus like ‘behavioural’ ones, exhibiting certain
characteristics of other process types
– tense like ‘material’ or ‘relational’, ability to project
like ‘mental’The Receiver is
the one to whom the saying is directed
e.g.
me, your parents, the court in tell me the whole truth, did you repeat that to your
parents?, describe to the court the scene of the accident.
a) The Verbiage is the function that corresponds to what is
said, representing it as a class of thing rather than as a report or quote
e.g. what in What did you say?
b) The Target occurs only in a subtype of ‘verbal’ clauses;
this function construes the entity that is targeted by the process of saying, which may be a
person, an object or an abstraction
Expansion: enhancing
Enhancing circumstances augment the
configuration of process + participants through the
specification of extent or location in
time or space of the unfolding of the process, the
manner of the unfolding of the
process, the cause of the unfolding of the process, or the
contingency of the unfolding of the
process.
a.
from circumstances that
are like a feature of the process construed circumstantially
b.
Cause: because of his
asthma is agnate with either a participant
A.
Extent construes the extent of the unfolding of the process in
space-time: the distance in space over which the process unfolds or the duration in time
during which the process unfolds. The interrogative forms for Extent are how far?, how
long?, how many [measure units]?, how many times?
B.
Location construes the location of the unfolding of the process in
space-time: the place where it unfolds or the time when it unfolds. The general interrogatives
of Location are where?, when?. Place includes not
only static location in space, but also the source, path and destination of
movement. Similarly, time includes not only static location in time, but also the temporal
analogues of source, path and destination
C.
Manner. The circumstantial element of Manner construes the way in which
the process is
actualized. Manner comprises four subcategories: Means, Quality, Comparison, Degree. These cover
a considerable range; Means is close to the participant role of Agent and Comparison is like
a participant in a clause with the same kind of process, whereas Quality and Degree are like
features of the Process itself. These differences in status are reflected in realizational
tendencies: Means and Comparison tend to be realized by prepositional phrases, whereas
Quality and Comparison tend to be realized by adverbial groups.
-
Means refers to the means whereby a process takes place; it is
typically expressed bya prepositional phrase with the preposition by or with.
-
Quality is typically expressed by an adverbial group, with -ly adverb
as Head; the interrogative is how?
or how ... ? plus appropriate adverb. Less commonly, Quality is realized by a
prepositional phrase.
-
Comparison is typically expressed by a prepositional phrase with like or
unlike, or an adverbial group of similarity or difference.
-
Degree is typically expressed by an adverbial group with a general
indication of degree such as much, a good deal, a lot, or with a
collocationally more restricted adverb of degree such as deeply, profoundly,
completely, heavily, badly. The collocationally restricted
adverbs collocate with
verbs serving as Process, as in ‘mental’ clauses: love + deeply, understand + completely,
believe + strongly, want + badly
-
Cause. The circumstantial element of Cause construes the reason why the
processis actualized. It includes not only Reason in the narrow sense of
existing conditions leading to the actualization of the process, but also Purpose in the
sense of intended conditions for which the process is actualized (what has been called ‘final
cause’).
7. Transitivity
and voice: another interpretation
We
will distinguished the types of process represented by the English clause, and
the various participant functions that are associated with each. The
circumstantial elements we were able to treat independently, without
distinguishing them according to process type; this is because, although there
are natural restrictions on the way particular circumstantials combine with
other elements, these often go with rather small classes and in any case do not
affect either the structure or the meaning. Each type of process, on the other
hand, is characterized by process-participant configurations where the
functions are particular to that type.
We
have constructed the table to suggest that (i) generalization across process
types and (ii) transitivity model are independently variable. In English and in
many other languages, it is the transitive model that differentiates the different
process types and it is the ergative model that generalizes across these
different process types. But the alignments could be different (for examples,
see the description of different languages in Caffarel, Martin &
Matthiessen, 2004, in particular Martin’s account of Tagalog transitivity and
Rose’s account of Pitjantjatjara transitivity).
A.
The transitive model
The
transitive model is based on the configuration of Actor + Process. The Actor is
construed as bringing about the unfolding of the Process through time; and this
unfolding is either confined in its outcome to the Actor or extended to another
participant, the Goal. The Goal is construed as being impacted by the Actor’s
performance of the Process. This model is illustrated by Text 5-15, an extract
from a traditional narrative – a retelling for children of the Noah’s Ark
biblical story.
The
entities serving as Actor in a ‘transitive’ or ‘intransitive’ clause and as
Goal are set out in Table 5-38. The transitive Actors are all ‘beings’ – God or
humans (but not animals) – with the exception of ‘flood’; but this natural
force is construed as being under God’s control (I am going to send a great
flood). This means that they are all ‘potent’ and all except d d for ‘flood’
are also ‘volitional’.
Turning
to the Goal, we find that ‘beings’ can take on this role; but when they do, a
more potent entity serves as Actor:
Actor:
‘God’ + Goal: ‘Noah & family’, Actor: ‘Noah & family’ + Goal: ‘animal’.
In addition, natural phenomena, artefacts, plants and food can serve as Goal,
the last three being largely restricted to the role of Goal. The transitivity
grammar of this text thus construes a particular ‘world view’: this is a world
where God can act on humans and on natural phenomena, where natural forces can
act destructively on the world under God’s control, where humans in turn can
act on animals, artefacts and plants but where plants do not act.
B.
The
ergative model Noah’s Ark is construed according to the transitive model;
But there is a
hint of ergative patterning. In the transitive model, the great flood and its
various manifestations (rain, rivers, water) serve either as Actor in
‘happening’ clauses or as Goal in ‘doing’ clauses:
‘I
am going to send a great flood g to wash the world away ,
’
The great flood g spread and the water kept rising. It covered fields and hills
and mountains.
In I
am going to send a great flood the nominal group d a great flood serves as
Goal, but other occurrences of nominal groups denoting forms of water all serve
as Actor. This is the transitive generalization. However, in the ergative
model, there is also a generalization to be made: the great flood serves the
same ergative role in I am going to send a great flood and the great flood
spread: see Figure 5-35.
This
is the role of Medium – the medium through which the process is actualized47;
in this case, it is the medium through which the movement of sending or
spreading is actualized. The difference between ‘doing’ and ‘happening’ derives
from a different principle from the transitive one of extension-&-impact:
‘happening’ means that the actualization of the process is represented as being
self-engendered, whereas ‘doing’ means that the actualization of the process is
represented as being caused by a participant that is external to the
combination of Process + Medium. This external cause is the Agent.
Halliday
(1968: 185/2005: 117) originally suggested the term ‘affected’ for what is now
called ‘medium’, although Fawcett and other linguists working with and
developing descriptions within the ‘Cardiff Grammar’ continue to use the term
‘affected’ in their accounts. Within other linguistic frameworks, something
like the role of Medium has been characterized by means of other labels. For
example, in Starosta’s (1988: 128) Lexicase theory, ‘“Patient” corresponds to
Halliday’s medium’.
Some
linguists have in fact thought that English is only lexically ergative. But
this is not a tenable position once we realize that lexis and grammar are not
separate modules or components, but merely zones within a continuum (Chapter 2,
Section 2.2):
C.
Ergative
and transitive participant roles
In addition to
Medium and Agent, we can recognize two further ergative participant roles – the
Beneficiary and the Range. Like Medium and Agent, they take on different
transitivity values according to the nature of the process type. Thus, for all
the participant roles we have one functional concept that is specific to the
process type, and another that is general to all process types; and the general
concept derives naturally from an ergative interpretation of the grammar of the
clause.
1.
Benefactive clauses:
Beneficiary
The Beneficiary is the one to whom or for whom the process is said to take
place. It appears in ‘material’ and ‘verbal’ clauses, and occasionally in
‘relational’ ones. (In other words, there are no Beneficiaries in ‘mental’,
‘behavioural’ or ‘existential’ clauses.)
(a)
In a ‘material’ clause, the Beneficiary is either the Recipient or the Client.
The Beneficiary is realized by (to +) nominal group (Recipient) or (for ( ( +)
nominal r group (Client); the presence of the preposition is determined by
textual factors (see below Section 5.7.4). (b) In a ‘verbal’ clause, the
Beneficiary is the Receiver. (c) There are also a few ‘relational’ clauses of
the ‘attributive’ mode containing a Beneficiary, e.g. him in she made him a
good wife, it cost him a pretty penny. We shall just refer to this as
Beneficiary, without introducing a more specific term, since these hardly
constitute a recognizably distinct role in the clause.
The
Beneficiary regularly functions as Subject in the clause; in that case the verb
is in the ‘receptive’ voice. An example of this is shown in Figure 5-39.
Those
in the top row are decoding clauses; the receptive is a medio-receptive and
hence rare. Those g below are encoding; the receptive is a ‘true’ receptive.
2.
Ranged
clauses: Range The Range is the element that specifies the range or domain of
the process. A Range may occur in ‘material’, ‘behavioural’, ‘mental’, ‘verbal’
and ‘relational’ clauses – but not in ‘existential’ ones: see Table 5-43. In a
‘material’, the Range is the Scope; in a ‘behavioural’ clause, the Range is the
Behaviour. In a ‘mental’ clause, the concept of Range helps to understand the
structure we have already identified, that of Senser and Phenomenon. It is not
an additional element, but an interpretation of the Phenomenon in one of its
structural configurations.
D.
The
complementarity of the transitive and ergative models
Probably
all transitivity systems in all languages, are some blend of these two semantic
models of processes, the transitive and the ergative. The transitive is a
linear interpretation; and since the only function that can be defined by
extension in this way is that of the Goal (together with, perhaps, the
analogous functions of Target in a verbal process and Phenomenon in a mental
process of the please type), systems that are predominantly transitive in
character tend to emphasize the distinction between participants (i.e. direct
participants, Actor and Goal only) and circumstances (all other functions)
Strictly
speaking an effective clause has the feature ‘agency’ rather than the
structural function Agent, because this may be left implicit, as in the glass
was broken. The presence of an ‘agency’ feature is, in fact, the difference
between a pair of clauses such as the glass broke and the glass was (or s got)
t broken: the latter embodies the feature of agency, so that one can ask the
question ‘who by?’, while the former allows for one participant only.
If
the clause is effective, since either participant can then become Subject there
is a choice between operative and receptive. The reasons for choosing receptive
are as follows: (1) to get the Medium as Subject, and therefore as unmarked
Theme (‘I’m telling you about the glass’); and (2) to make the Agent either (i)
late news, by putting it last (‘culprit: the cat’), or (ii) implicit, by
leaving it out. In spoken English the great majority of receptive clauses are,
in fact, Agent-less; the glass was broken is more common than the glass was
broken by the cat. The speaker leaves the listener to locate the source. But,
as we have seen, there are other potential Subjects besides Agent and Medium.
There are the other participants, the Beneficiary and the Range, either of
which may be selected as Subject of the clause; the verb will then likewise be
in the passive. Examples of these are given in Figure 5-38. Then there are the
‘indirect’ participants functioning as Complements to prepositions, some of
which (as referred to above) are potential Subjects; these give various other
kinds of passive such as ‘location-receptive’, e.g.
‘manner-receptive’, e.g. this pen’s never been
written with, and so on. Normally these are also medio-receptives, i.e. they
are middle not effective clauses. But receptives with idiomatic phrasal verbs,
such as
Garbage
collection g , always sporadic, had been done away with entirely the last few
weeks. [COCA] And both President Obama and Michelle Obama are really looked up
to there and, yes, on that rock star type status. [COCA] that prize has never
been put in for are often ‘true’ receptives in the sense that the prepositional
phrase really represents a participant, as in the examples look at the sky,
wait for the boat discussed above. Analysis in Figure 5-42.
with
(i) mental clauses and with (ii) relational ones. (i) Corresponding to the
initiating structure in material clauses, we find an inducing structure in
mental clauses; for example, remind can be interpreted as ‘induce to remember’
(cf. Footnote 25 above), as in:
The
Saudis also reminded Hariri that King Abdullah’s July 2010 arrival in Beirut
aboard the same plane as Syrian president Assad was intended to underscore
Riyadh’s acquiescence in Damascus’s superior role in Lebanon. [COCA]
If
the clause already has an Agent in the structure, the only way this can be done
is by using an analytic causative; this makes it possible to bring in an Agent
of the second order, as Figure 5-44. Figure 5-45 shows how these clauses appear
in the receptive voice. The ergative structure is open-ended, and a further
round of agency can always be added on:
The
ball rolled: Fred rolled the ball: Mary made Fred roll the ball: John got Mary
to make Fred roll the ball: ...
The
transitive structure, on the other hand, is configurational; it cannot be
extended in this way. Thus, from a transitive point of view, Mary made Fred
roll the ball is not a single l process; it is two processes forming one
complex. But at this point, to take up the notion.
Tidak ada komentar:
Posting Komentar